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Nursing scholars consider caring a key concept in understanding what is involved in nursing and believe
that it is a major issue in nursing ethics. In this paper, the moral characteristics required for nursing care
are described and these characteristics are discussed on the basis of taking responsibility for the Other, as
described in Levinas’ ethics. First of all, the altruistic aspect of care in terms of Levinas’ ethics is examined.
That is, a nurse should meet the needs of a person who is suffering, respond to them morally, and take
responsibility. Levinas puts an emphasis on passive sensibilities that lead a nurse to respond to the needs
of someone who is suffering, and also on the moral responsibility that encourages a nurse to empathize
with others. However, his ethics cannot explain clearly how a nurse, as a moral subject with autonomy,
forms a caring relationship with others. [Asian Nursing Research 2008;2(4):208–213]
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INTRODUCTION
Nursing scholars consider caring to be a key concept
in understanding what is involved in nursing and they
also believe it to be a major issue in nursing ethics.
They describe caring as a fundamental moral value
or a moral ideal for the protection, preservation, and
improvement of human dignity (Fry, 1989; Morse
1990;Watson, 1988). Caring is a moral imperative, so
nurses are expected to care for others altruistically as
part of their duty (Watson). Moreover, most nursing
scholars (Gastmans, 1999; Nortvedt, 1998) place an
emphasis on moral sensitivity and responsibility in the
act of caring. The reason is that appreciation of the
plight of another necessarily involves emotional sen-
sitivity, which exerts a moral pull on the caregiver.
The capacity for caring extends from sympathy as 
a moral feeling linked to emotional involvement with
a patient. Caring therefore includes moral feelings of
responsibility, which occur after grasping the plight
of the patient and responding to the patient’s needs
and concerns. Nursing ethicists consider the char-
acteristics of caring as a moral attitude within the
ethics of virtue rather than as principle-based ethics
(Gastman). According to traditional ethical theory,
principle-based ethics stress the autonomous self and
the role of reason in performing right actions and jus-
tice, like Kant’s ethics and utilitarianism. However, the
ethics of caring emphasize the moral attitude which
implies an interpersonal relationship and the role of
moral sensitivity and responsibility for others.
Based upon this understanding of caring, the moral
characteristics of nursing care can be summarized as
follows: (a) caring in nursing is a moral imperative;
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(b) caring includes moral feelings of responsibility
for others, (c) a caring relationship is focused on the
needs of a suffering Other. Therefore, it is necessary
to have a new debate on ethical theories which sup-
port philosophically how care for others in nursing
can have significant implications for the moral imper-
ative and feelings in the human relationship.
Thus this paper aims to examine and discuss the
moral characteristics of caring according to Levinas’
ethics of the Other, because his ethics place an em-
phasis on the moral imperative as being responsibil-
ity for the Other and moral feelings on the basis of
human affectivity.
Caring in nursing
Edwards (2001) characterizes caring action in the
following ways. First, it is intentional. It is not only
the belief after scrutiny that a patient has a need,
but is also an action with the hope of helping him/
her. Second, caring action is relational. It stems from
the relationship between the carer and the one being
cared for. Such a relationship has been molded more
by a concern for others and his/her need than by a
concern for the nurse him/herself.Third, caring action
requires that a person meet the needs or interests of
others. That is the most crucial aspect of caring in a
nursing situation.
For nursing to meet the needs of others, a phenom-
enological appreciation of other people as human
beings with human vulnerabilities is called for. This
appreciation helps one to understand the person who
is suffering in the process of life experience. Given
that nursing action pursues health, it is necessary to
grasp the experience of suffering of a human being
with vulnerabilities because nursing care in that sense
is based on the requirement to understand the need
of a patient in suffering and pain, and to respond to
it. Furthermore, care in nursing is extended to an
obligatory moral dimension to respond fully and
appropriately to a suffering patient.
At this point, the role of emotion is to exert a moral
pull on the nurse to respond to a patient’s needs.These
emotions can include sadness, sorrow, anger, depres-
sion, compassion and joy, all of which constitute a
strong emotional involvement on the part of the nurse.
Such emotional involvement in a patient’s suffering
can be shown in a nurse’s sympathetic awareness.
Sympathy means a mental participation with those
who are suffering. Sympathy is a sort of moral feeling
because it proceeds to the moral aspect of responding
to the call of others who are suffering. Moral feelings
produce such a strong sense of obligation that a nurse
cannot choose not to respond to and take responsibil-
ity for a patient’s call.Thus the ethical characteristic of
nursing care lies in a nurse receiving a patient’s call,
responding, and taking responsibility for it through
emotional involvement with his/her suffering.
In the act of caring, as described above, human
beings should be understood as emotional beings with
vulnerabilities. They have the capacity to suffer, to
feel pain or pleasure. A nurse in the presence of a
patient’s suffering is encountering human experi-
ence the full force of human emotions.The emotion
produced in the nurse at this moment is an involun-
tary obligation and a non-optional responsibility
(Nortvert, 1998).
In the context of care for others in nursing, it is
possible to study care in terms of responsibility for
others using Levinas’ ethics. His ethics are grounded
in the sensitivity to the faces of others with human
vulnerabilities. These ethics do not arise from moral
autonomy based on a subject’s rational judgment.
Ethics here originate from having affection for the
sick, the poor, and the alienated, and place an
emphasis on an unavoidable obligation and responsi-
bility to respond to their calls for assistance due to
an interest in their faces. The obligation and respon-
sibility come from outside, seeing the patient’s face at
close proximity, and accompanying practice with time
and endeavor, rather than coming from the subject’s
autonomous moral judgment.
Therefore, I will study the ethical foundation of
caring based on Levinas’ ethics for the Other and will
reveal the implications and limitations when Levinas’
ethics try to explain the moral characteristic of caring
in nursing.
Levinas’ ethics: sensibilities
The first thing to consider when looking at Levinas’
perspective on human beings is that he understands
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them first as bodily entities before being subjects
with rational thought and free will. He makes clear
the meaning of sense in the human body which is a
fundamental reality preceding rationality.While tra-
ditional ethical theories stressed a moral subject with
rational thinking and autonomy and free will, Levinas’
ethics are based on the primacy of the Other—on
heteronomy, which is the site of the ethical subject
and provides a way to explain the originality of an
ethical subject. It is therefore necessary to know what
the ethical self is as a sensitive being and to know
about the ethics of the Other.
Levinas says that sensibilities help human beings
transcend their selfish egocentrism to arrive at an eth-
ical self who can accept the Other.The ethical self is
formed only by meeting the Other. The ethical self
recognizes a human as a being with a desire to meet
the Other as well as being one with inner egocen-
tricity. Human egocentricity fades when it meets
the Other, or as it forms a relationship with another
person. When this occurs, the self does not connect
with the Other as an object of one’s desire or as com-
pensation for what one lacks. A desire for the Other
does not represent taking the Other into the self or
identifying the self with the Other. Rather, this desire
means openness and commitment to the Other, which
enables one to transcend the self in the Other. The
transcendence is shown as a way of self-openness,
through “epiphany or hospitality towards others
through opening my door” (Kim, 2001).The epiphany
towards others means an appearance of infinity, which
presents itself as the face of others “in the ethical
resistance that paralyses my powers” (Levinas, 1991).
How does the human being composed of flesh and
blood have ethical relationships with others? The self
who is exposed to others is a sensitive being with vul-
nerabilities which can be affected directly by others.
Vulnerability in relationships with others is the part
which connects one directly to others before active
rational thinking starts, and is affected by those others
(Levinas, 1978). This human being has sensibilities
that mean he/she cannot be cold-hearted or feel free
from anxiety, discomfort and burdens caused by
others. Levinas refers to this status of sensitivity as
closeness or proximity. It is the state of mind toward
others which facilitates or leads to approaching them.
Deciding to get close to the Other can often be ex-
plained by the appearance of the Other’s face.What
does their appearance tell me? The face is the direct
and first word, a primordial ethical expression which
has ethical orders and imperatives, such as “you shall
not commit murder” (Levinas, 1991, p. 199).
The epiphany of the face of the suffering Other
is the first thing, as well as the ethical stem word, that
appeals to us and orders us to act ethically. In other
words,“the face opens the primordial discourse whose
first word is obligation, which no interiority permits
avoiding” (Levinas, 1991, p. 201).The face stares, ap-
pears and expresses itself to me.The discourse caused
by the epiphany cannot be avoided by keeping silent.
The appearance of the face is an obligation as
well as an order which makes it impossible to avoid
or destroy the appealing self, and it opens the pri-
mordial discourse. By responding to the face, I come
to realize the obligation imposed on me by the Other,
and to start discourse by speaking to them. Discourse
is formed in a face-to-face relationship. The face
thus binds us together by stimulating discourse. In
discourse, speaking to the Other is to be in proximity
to him/her, and the responsibility to respond comes
from the subject’s passivity (Levinas, 1978). What
then is the passivity of a subject? When I speak to
the Other, I am exposed to them, called, and ad-
dressed by them, which means that the subject is
exposed to the extent of sacrificing his or her needs
and getting involved in their predicament rather than
sacrificing one’s own predicament. Levinas empha-
sizes this ethical situation of calling as being more
passive than anything else. In his ethical theory, the
discourse is referred to as calling and responding to
the Other in an asymmetrical relationship between
the Other and oneself, in contrast to the traditional
ethical sense of a dialogue, which occurs based on
the rationale of a symmetrical relationship. It is not
a reciprocal relationship, but an asymmetric one in
which the subject is exposed to sacrifice on behalf
of the Other, and in which the self comes to realize
the obligation and urgency of the face, to respond to
its expression and appealing, to welcome and speak,
and thus to start discourse.
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Levinas’ ethics: responsibility for others
Levinas characterizes responsibility for others caused
by an ethical self in the following way: “In obsession
is a responsibility of the ego for that the ego has not
wished, that is, for the Other” (Levinas, 1978, p.114).
The subject’s passivity is taken hostage by the Other
and is required to take responsibility for them. The
hostage faces unlimited responsibility. As long as we
exist as hostages, the world has closeness affected
by compassion, sympathy and forgiveness. The re-
sponsibility caused by the Other demands that we
should take more responsibility for our own behav-
ior, which asks for self-sacrifice even at the cost of
one’s own life. Taking responsibility for the Other is
to suffer vicariously and to make sacrifices on the
Other’s behalf. Levinas (1978) describes this ethical
responsibility as substitution. Substitution is to put
oneself into the Other’s situation. This means the
self is accused of what the Other does or suffers, or
is responsible for what they do or suffer. For this
reason, the relationship between the Other and self
is asymmetrical, because the self should then exist
on behalf of the Other, and not vice versa.
As described above, Levinas claims that for every-
one the ethical relationship arises in the appearance
of the Other’s face, and that moral responsibility for
the Other stems not from a subject’s moral autonomy
but from the subject’s passive sensibilities towards
the face of the Other. The passiveness of a subject
means that when I am exposed to his/her gaze, I am
influenced by him/her without intending to be and am
supposed to accept him/her. Levinas writes that an
ethical subject embodies human vulnerability shown
to the Other, experiences vicarious suffering, and is
taken hostage. In other words, the face tells me to
protect and serve the Other because the Other, not
I, becomes my master, thereby producing an ethical
situation in which I cannot discard him/her. Levinas
describes the situation thus: ‘I am persecuted on the
Other’s behalf,’ or ‘I am exposed to the suffering of
the Other’ (Levinas, 1978, pp. 113–118). Further-
more, he claims that when I go through vicarious suf-
fering for the Other (when I am taken hostage by
the Other) this world comes near to compassion, sym-
pathy and mercy. It is vicarious suffering that accepts
the Other and carries their burden of suffering. That
is, commitment to the Other. That is what a moral
subject is; it doesn’t appear until I move the center
of my life to that of the Other.
Levinas, in contrast to Kant who sets up moral
responsibility based upon individual reason and
autonomy, imposes the responsibility on the self’s 
sensibilities towards vulnerability, and stresses care,
commitment and responsibility.
In conclusion, according to Levinas, when the ethi-
cal self rooted in sensibilities is exposed to the Other,
the self responds to the Other through openness, and
offers sacrifice on his/her behalf. Moral responsibility
and the response through the epiphany, expression
and speaking face-to-face to the Other causes pain
to the ethical self, and forces the self to make sacri-
fices. The ethical self with its sensibilities comes to
spend one’s flesh and blood, time and endeavor, and
to practice morality through openness, proximity and
closeness as a result of looking at the face.
Implications and limits of Levinas’ ethics in nursing
What implications does Levinas’ ethical thinking have
for the caring ethics of a nurse? His ethics for the
Other places an emphasis on the moral responsibility
of a nurse. A nurse should respond to the calling and
crying of a patient with vulnerabilities.According to
Levinas, moral responsibility for the Other is imposed
not by autonomous thought which has one judge rea-
sonably using the conscious mind, but by a self’s pas-
sive sensibilities influenced by the appearance of the
face of the Other. It follows that a nurse’s responsibil-
ity for a patient’s need does come not from his/her
autonomous thought but from the passivity possessed
by a patient’s face and gaze. It means that in the
nursing situation, moral sensibilities arise during the
process of a nurse looking at a patient’s face, per-
ceiving what the face expresses and responding to it.
Rational judgment comes next and depends on how
one answers the nursing call of the patient. A nurse
with an open-minded attitude should listen to the
patient’s appeal and have a sense of responsibility to
respond it. A nurse should put her/himself into a
patient’s situation and be responsible for his/her suf-
fering and life condition, but not vice versa. The
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urgency of the responsibility arises from the nurse’s
passivity that makes it impossible for the nurse to
avoid the suffering. For Levinas, because the unlim-
ited responsibility ethics for the Other arise from
the facial appearance, a nurse’s moral responsibility
is imposed in the process so that a nurse undertakes
discourse with a patient face-to-face, and the respon-
sibility does not result from one’s inner autonomous
moral conscience.A nurse plays the role of substitute
for a patient’s suffering, so he/she should exhibit devo-
tion and mercy, which is not chosen in drawing an
inference from rational thought. Ethics in nursing is
not what one thinks on one’s own, but practical behav-
ior in face-to-face situations.
However, on a practical level, this application of
Levinas’ responsibility to care has a couple of limi-
tations, namely the passivity of the ethical subject
and asymmetrical Other-centered ethics. First, let’s
think about a nurse’s passive ethical situation based
on the notion of ‘passive sensibility of a body’. Levinas’
ethics have to be passive because they are the answer,
in obsession of the sensibilities, to the calling or asking
of the face rather than arising from inner autonomy.
For Levinas, a nurse’s ethical situation cannot be
avoided because a nurse must answer a patient’s call
without inner optional autonomy. However, this raises
another question. Is it only responsibility resulting
from sensibilities towards a patient’s suffering that
makes it possible for a nurse to take care of the patient
when she or he also has to think seriously and morally
about deciding what rational nursing is, and even
when he/she has to choose moral decision-making?
It is important that a nurse has sensibilities which
make him/her meet and approach the face of a pa-
tient, and it is also important that a nurse with moral
autonomy should appreciate the suffering of a patient
in the context of a moral relationship. A nurse is to
be influenced by and obsessed with the face. How-
ever, a nurse should go beyond that. In other words,
a nurse needs to reflect autonomously within his/
her conscience on what the face means. Such reflec-
tion helps a nurse form a caring relationship with a
patient.
Second, it might be seen as controversial to say that
an ethical subject engages in vicarious suffering. That
kind of suffering is central to Christian tradition,
but it is very unusual in philosophy. Is it really pos-
sible that a nurse takes on the suffering of a patient
in a clinical setting? It is obvious that Levinas does
not suggest that substitutive suffering should be a
universal ethical norm, but he describes suffering as
something that helps a self restore its own ethical
subject. However, if a nurse has to experience the
suffering of a patient vicariously in order to restore
his/her ethical subject that seems to go too far. That
is reminiscent of the Christian ministry’s attitude in-
spired by Jesus Christ who bore everyone’s suffering.
One criticism, therefore, of Levinas is that his ethics
demand a degree of self-sacrifice which could be too
much of an obligation for the autonomous profes-
sional nurse.
CONCLUSION
I have studied the moral characteristics of care in nurs-
ing through nursing theories, and have also discussed
aspects of Levinas’ ethics for the Other. The charac-
teristic of care in nursing is a sort of moral response
to a patient in suffering, which constitutes the process
of understanding of and emotional involvement
with those who are suffering.Also, care is understood
as the moral ideal of protecting, preserving and en-
hancing human dignity. In this paper, I have looked
at nursing ethics as the ethics of responsibility for
others from the perspective of Levinas’ ethics, which
demands that a nurse should listen to those who are
suffering and respond to their call. His ethics on the
basis of sensibilities accentuate the nurses’ moral
responsibility which prevents them from turning
away from the ethical situation and compels them to
listen to patients’ suffering and respond to their call.
All of this is caused by meeting a patient face-to-
face. In Levinas’ ethics, the unlimited responsibility for
the Other stems from the emotional appearance of
the face, just as a nurse’s moral responsibility results
from addressing and answering the face, not from
his/her inner autonomous moral judgment. A nurse
should, as a substitute for patients’ suffering, offer
devotion and mercy, which is not chosen according
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to his/her own decision but is direct practice caused
by bodily sensibilities.
However, his ethics for the Other raises a couple
of questions. First, is it possible for nurses to take
the patients’ place in order to bear their suffering?
It might be possible that we should expect nurses to
bear suffering vicariously in a religious tradition that
has an emphasis on altruistic self-sacrifice. Next, is it
unavoidable that nurses have passive sensibilities?
In other words, should nurses accept patients’ suffer-
ing without their own autonomy? I claim that nurses,
in many nursing situations, should overcome their
own passive sensibilities, keep a reflective distance,
and preserve their own autonomy to help them reflect
on the situation morally. It is a primary and basic
duty that nurses should not avoid a patient’s call,
but rather accept it. Furthermore, it is necessary that
nurses should be qualified with a conscience and
moral autonomy in order to provide a caring relation-
ship and action.
In conclusion, I have tried to examine the ethical
characteristics of nursing care from the perspective
of Levinas’ ethics for the Other. As far as we know,
according to Levinas, nursing ethics as ethics of caring
for the suffering Other provide the most primary and
basic ethical language and obligation. However, at
the secondary level, it is necessary that nurses have
their own autonomous morality, because they can then
perform caring actions when they possess autonomous
critical thinking and an attitude that enables them
to imagine patients’ suffering. They can then decide
upon an appropriate care plan. In that context, as
the search continues for a philosophical foundation
to support the ethical characteristics of care in nursing,
a theory which bolsters a subject’s moral autonomy
should also be explored to serve as an addition to the
Other-centered ethical perspective based sensitivity.
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